Neuroenhancement, Ethics, & Future of Disability Law by Hanrahan, Donna
NEUROENHANCEMENT, ETHICS, & FUTURE OF DISABILITY LAW  
 
By: Donna Hanrahan1 
 
Introduction 
 
 The current wave of neurotechnological innovation, catalyzed in part by federal 
funding of neuroscience research through the Brain Research through Advancing 
Innovative Neurotechnologies 2  (“BRAIN”) Initiative in 2013, calls for further 
examination of the legal and ethical considerations surrounding its use.  This includes 
technologies that link directly with the human nervous system for diagnostic, therapeutic, 
research, or lifestyle purposes.3  These neurotechnologies have a variety of applications, 
ranging from restoration to enhancement, each with varying levels of ethical concern. 
 Neurotechnologies that aim to restore and enhance human capabilities will likely 
disrupt the current legislative framework surrounding disability law.  It is necessary to 
anticipate ethical considerations early in the neurotechnology development process and 
mitigate potential pitfalls and gaps in current legislation before harm results.  Thus, it is 
vital to take a proactive approach and allow ethical inquiries to guide law and policy 
while these technologies are in development, rather than after the products are available 
on the market.   
The Growing Field Of Neurotechnology 
 
 The current wave of neurotechnological innovation suggests that the United States 
is experiencing the beginnings of a global “revolution in neuroscience.”4  With growing 
federal funding for neuroscience research, rising venture capital investment in 
neurotechnology, and vast developments in the field of neurotechnology that allow us to 
monitor, restore, and enhance human function, it is likely that neurotechnology will soon 
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have disruptive social, political, and economic consequences on American society.  
While most neurotechnologies are still in their infancy, their future applications hold 
great promise, as well as great concern, for the future.5  
Neurotechnologies, such as transcranial magnetic stimulation (“TMS”), deep 
brain stimulation (“DBS”), neuroprosthetics, and brain-computer interface (“BCI”) 
technology, currently exist on a wide spectrum of development, ranging from early phase 
research and clinical trials to Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) approval and 
market availability, as demonstrated in Figure 1 below.6 
            Figure 1.  Neurotechnology’s Spectrum of Development 
 
 
The Brain Initiative & Gray Matters 
 
 In 2013, the Obama Administration proposed a $100 million initiative to map the 
human brain and develop new neuroscience technologies through the BRAIN Initiative.7 
This initiative seeks to revolutionize our understanding of the brain and develop new 
ways to treat, cure, and prevent brain disorders such as epilepsy, Alzheimer’s disease, 
and traumatic brain injury.8  Recognizing that novel research often raises new ethical 
challenges, the BRAIN Initiative pledged to adhere to high ethical standards for its 
research initiatives.9  In anticipation of social concerns in the wake of neuroscientific 
advancements, President Obama called upon the Bioethics Commission, an executive 
- Synthetic telepathy 
through internet 
transmission of EEG 
signals (BCI) 
 
-Shifting learning phase 
from user to computer 
using electronic neural 
networks (BCI)
IN IDEATION
-Bionic limbs 
(neuroprosthetics) 
- Braingate technology for 
communication in 
paralyzed individuals
(BCI)
IN DEVELOPMENT
- Cochlear Implants  
(neuroprosthetics) 
- Deep Brain Stimulation 
(DBS) 
-Transcranial magnetic 
stimulation (TMS)
ON MARKET
2
Health Law Outlook, Vol. 8 [2015], Iss. 1, Art. 1
https://scholarship.shu.edu/health-law-outlook/vol8/iss1/1
3 
advisory panel focusing on medicine, science, ethics, religion, law, and engineering, to 
consider the ethical and social issues surrounding neuroscience in July 2013 as part of the 
BRAIN Initiative.10  To that end, the Bioethics Commission released Volume I of “Gray 
Matters: Integrated Approaches for Neuroscience, Ethics, and Technology” (“the 
Report”) in May 2014, which provides a broad overview of the ethical issues surrounding 
neuroscience and stresses the importance of integrating ethics into research from the 
earliest planning phases.11  The Report also provides a cursory overview of some ethical 
considerations surrounding neuroscience, including privacy, cognitive enhancement and 
justice, and the ethically problematic history of psychosurgery.12  
  The Report leaves much to be desired, however, when it comes to practical 
application of ethical approaches.13  In the Hastings Center Report, bioethicist Ronald 
Green argues that even as a preliminary proposal, “the recommendations in Gray Matters 
do not go far enough.”14  Green calls for the formation of a full ethical, legal, and social 
implications (“ELSI”) initiative for neuroethics to create a more innovative and 
comprehensive body of ethical recommendations to support far-ranging research. 15 
Nevertheless, the Bioethics Commission is expected to expand its analysis beyond 
research and will consider the ethical and societal implications of neuroscience 
applications more broadly in the forthcoming installment of “Gray Matters.”16 	  
Neurotechnology & Potential For Human Enhancement 
 
 These neurotechnologies have a variety of applications, ranging from restoration 
to enhancement, each with varying levels of ethical concern.  Least ethically problematic 
is the restoration of senses for individuals with disabilities, as with the use of cochlear 
implants as a neuroprosthetic to restore hearing in deaf individuals.  Similarly, the use of 
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neurotechnology for treatment of neurological disorders, such as using TMS as a 
neurostimulator to treat depression, does not ignite robust ethical debate.  On the other 
hand, the use of neurotechnology for human enhancement purposes, such as 
neuroprosthetics for enhanced senses, would certainly raise complex and contentious 
ethical concerns.   
 As demonstrated in Figure 2 below, the emerging market for human enhancement 
includes improvement in behavioral (i.e. increased focus), physical (i.e. improved vision 
and hearing), emotional (i.e. enhanced mood), and mental (i.e. unlimited memory recall) 
capacities.17  This figure demonstrates the breadth of influence that neurotechnologies 
may have on the human body.  As neurotechnologies have the capacity to augment our 
abilities beyond baseline across a wide range of capabilities, their use may challenge 
traditional notions of personal identity and what it means to be human.  
Figure 2.  Neuroenhancement Capabilities 
 
 
The Eroding Dichotomy Between Restoration And Enhancement 
 
 A key inquiry in the conversation surrounding human enhancement is whether a 
particular technology has a restorative function or an enhancement function.18  Indeed, 
there has been much debate amongst scholars regarding the dichotomy between these 
terms.  It is necessary to grapple with “where to draw the threshold line between 
restoration and enhancement--or whether to draw the line at all.”19  
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Traditionally, the term “restoration” indicates a “medical, surgical or 
psychological treatment aimed at reinstating individuals with diseases or impairments to 
their original or to a so-defined ‘normal’ physical and mental state of health or aimed at 
preventing diseases or disabilities.”20  Conversely, “enhancement” is generally a term 
used to “describe efforts to increase or improve the condition, capacities and performance 
of healthy person.”21 
Unlike restorative treatments required by necessity, devices and surgeries for 
enhancement are elective procedures the risks of which are not outweighed by therapeutic 
benefits.  As the FDA does not review surgical procedures associated with the 
implantation of such neurotechnology devices, the procedures themselves, as well as the 
devices, may have an effect on the brain and lead to unanticipated changes in cognition, 
personality, or mood.22  
While some argue that there is a “red line” to distinguish between therapy and 
enhancement, others argue that these concepts are evolving and context-specific on social 
constructions. 23   As restorative neurotechnologies also have the potential for 
enhancement, the dichotomy will likely continue to erode.  Cortical implants, for 
example, may be considered therapy when used to assist the blind in restoring vision, but 
may be considered enhancement when used to expand the visible spectrum of light in 
otherwise healthy individuals.24  Therefore, the terms “restoration” and “enhancement” 
are not mutually exclusive.25  
Ethical Considerations Surrounding Neuroenhancement 
 Although many of the ethical issues surrounding neuroscience are not wholly 
unique to the field, they encompass certain ethical considerations uniquely associated 
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with the brain.  More so than other technologies, advances in neuroscience raise 
questions about the human experience, such as personal identity, free will, and 
autonomy.26  Accordingly, as neurotechnologies grow in their applications beyond the 
field of medicine, it is imperative to carefully consider how such advancements in 
technology should be used.27  Taking into consideration the exceptional nature of the 
human brain, it is appropriate to approach neurotechnology with weightier ethical inquiry 
than that of other types of medical technology.  Moreover, the potential for 
neurotechnology to disclose sensitive information that is preferred to be kept confidential 
violates the longstanding value of privacy and may lead to stigma or discrimination.  
 For example, neurotechnology offers insights into the brain that raise ethical 
concerns about privacy, particularly concerning an individual’s ability to choose how 
personal, sensitive, or intimate information is acquired.28  Information gleaned from 
neurotechnology may provide information about one’s behavioral predisposition, as 
mentioned above, including racial prejudices, pedophilia, compulsive gambling, sexual 
preference, political preference, extroversion and introversion, cooperativeness, and 
dangerousness, which has been used to determine psychopathy.29  The existing legal and 
ethical framework seems insufficient to “give individuals sufficient control over the use 
and disclosure of their functional neuroimaging information by third parties 
(confidentiality), the collection of their functional neuroimaging information by third 
parties (privacy), and the self-revelation of their functional neuroimaging information 
(identity).”30  As neurotechnology becomes developed in a way that can potentially 
monitor or predict private thoughts, ethical considerations must be further deliberated to 
anticipate potential social consequences, such as stigma and discrimination, and mitigate 
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potential concerns through the development of law and policy.  
Legal And Policy Implications Surrounding Neurotechnology, Neuroenhancement 
& Disability Law 
Neurotechnology is expanding the depth and breadth of the ability spectrum.31  
While it is true that neurotechnology may “level the playing field” for individuals with 
disabilities, thus compensating for the “unfairness of natural inequalities” in abilities, it 
may also broaden the inequalities that exist in our society by improving upon those with 
normal physical and mental functioning.32  Thus, neurotechnology may reinforce existing 
educational, economic, and other disparities.33  
If neurotechnological enhancement becomes as commonplace as predicted, it is 
possible that one day the enhanced majority may view their unenhanced counterparts as 
disabled.34  Some scholars go so far as to say that society is already well on its way to this 
reality.35  With restorative neurotechnology doubling as enhancement neurotechnology, 
the disabled may improve their abilities beyond the baseline average.  It is not 
implausible that a healthy individual may also want to engage with neurotechnology to 
enhance his or her mental or physical abilities.36  As both disabled and healthy individuals 
are increasingly willing to restore or augment their abilities through neurotechnology, we 
must reassess the legislative definition of disability.   
Ethical principles should guide statutory developments to protect against 
violations of privacy and stigma and discrimination.  Specifically, ethics will inform 
changes to the existing legislative framework for protecting individuals with disabilities 
against discrimination under the Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”).  In addition, 
ethics will provide a context for developing legislation, such as the proposed Neuro 
Information Nondiscrimination Act (“NINA”), to safeguard ethical principles of privacy 
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and autonomy and protect against stigma and discrimination based on information 
surrounding the brain before a condition manifests.   
The Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”) 
 The ADA was signed into law by President Bush on July 26, 1990 as a 
"declaration of equality for people with disabilities” to end the “unjustified segregation 
and exclusion of persons with disabilities from the mainstream of American life.”37  
Based on ethical principles of equality, justice, and civil rights, the ADA protects 
disabled individuals from discrimination in employment, education, and public access 
settings.38  This Section focuses on Title I of the ADA, which prohibits discrimination 
against individuals with disabilities in the workplace and requires reasonable 
accommodations for individuals with disabilities.39  The ADA defines disability as “a 
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life 
activities of [an] individual; a record of such impairment; or being regarded as having 
such an impairment.”40  
In its current form, the ADA is not adequately flexible to respond to changes in 
society that may result from neuroscience and technology.  If conventional human 
abilities become inferior absent enhancing interventions, the ADA seems insufficient to 
protect the “unenhanced” as “disabled. ” Moreover, as neurotechnologies have the ability 
to fully restore and enhance the abilities of individuals with impairments, the ADA will 
be challenged to consider mitigating factors when determining disability status for 
protection under the ADA.  
Initially, the ADA failed to address whether courts should consider mitigating 
measures when determining an individual’s disability status.41  In 1999, the Supreme 
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Court addressed this issue in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., holding that mitigating 
factors, including medication or mechanical devices, should be taken into account when 
determining one’s disability status.42  In Sutton, plaintiffs filed suit against an airline that 
refused to hire them because of their severe nearsightedness.43  The Supreme Court held 
under the ADA, plaintiffs were not considered disabled because they were not 
substantially limited in a major life activity due to the restorative function that corrective 
lenses provided. 44  Moreover, the Supreme Court clarified the definition of disability 
under the ADA, holding that “[a] disability exists only when an impairment ‘substantially 
limits' a major life activity, not where it ‘might,’ ‘could,’ or ‘would’ be substantially 
limiting if mitigating measures were not taken.”45  Disability advocates and scholars 
criticized the Sutton ruling for denying the “disabled” coverage based on the “mitigating 
measures” the Court employed, and thus unduly limiting the ADA's coverage.46 
In 2008, Congress passed the ADA Amendments Act (“ADAAA”).  The 
amendments prohibit “mitigating factors” from being taken into account when 
determining one’s disability status under the ADA, thus overturning the Sutton decision.47 
The applicable language of the ADAAA states: “[t]he determination of whether an 
impairment substantially limits a major life activity shall be made without regard to the 
ameliorative effects of mitigating measures” including drugs, medical devices, and 
assistive technologies.48  The definition of “major life activity” was amended to “the 
operation of bodily function, including but not limited to, functions of the immune 
system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder, neurological, brain, respiratory, 
circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive functions.”49  Under the ADAAA, modifications, 
additions, or enhancements are irrelevant in determining whether an individual is 
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disabled under the law.50  Despite Congress’s beneficent intentions to extend broad 
coverage to those with disabilities with the ADAAA, the amendments are insufficient to 
protect individuals against discrimination in light of neuroenhancement technologies.  
As mitigating factors become more advanced and commonplace, due in part to 
advancements in neuroscience and technology, the ADA appears insufficient to eliminate 
discrimination based on disability.  By categorically prohibiting courts from considering 
mitigating measures, an individual who corrects a disability through restorative measures, 
and becomes enhanced in the process, may still bring suit under the ADA.51  Conversely,	  an	   individual	  without	   enhancements	  may	   not	   bring	   suit	   under	   the	   ADA	   for	   cases	  involving	  discrimination	  by	  those	  with	  enhancements	  toward	  those	  who	  have	  none.	  	  
This seems to violate the spirit of the legislation.  Some futurist scholars, such as Collin 
Bockman, suggest that Congress should consider amending the ADA allow courts to 
consider mitigating factors that have been employed by the claimant, when those factors 
are: 
“a prosthetic or implanted medical device that (1) interfaces 
with the claimant's nervous system either directly or in such 
a way that operating the device is accomplished through 
thought alone; and (2) compensates for the claimant's 
impairment to such an extent that a reasonable person 
would consider the impairment completely eliminated or 
transformed into an advantage over ordinary human 
capabilities.”52 
 
Moreover, there is no provision in the ADA that protects individuals from “comparative 
discrimination,” where “enhanced individuals discriminate against an otherwise ordinary 
individual whom they consider ‘disabled’ due to his lack of upgrades.”53  While the 
notion of an “enhanced majority” may seem futuristic, it is, in fact, a feasible, if not 
likely, circumstance of the future.  It seems certain that neurotechnologies will continue 
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to monitor, alter, and enhance the human body.54  Neurotechnology that is currently in 
development may one day be used for enhancement in the mainstream.  Thus, individuals 
with ordinary human capabilities may be considered less-abled than those with 
enhancements.  Individuals without enhancements may experience express or implied 
coercion to obtain enhancements in order to be competitive.55  To ensure that the 
unenhanced do not experience discrimination in favor of an enhanced individual, 
Congress must consider “comparative discrimination” in developing more comprehensive 
protections against discrimination based on disability.   
The issue of “comparative discrimination” hinges on the definition of disability 
and who may be considered disabled.  A criticism of the ADAAA, and of the ADA 
generally, is that it fails to define disability as a social construct determined by societal 
norms. 56   Many disability advocates, particularly social-constructivists, reject the 
dichotomy between the terms disabled and non-disabled.57  Instead of this dichotomy, 
disability should be interpreted as a fluid and context-sensitive concept.58  Advancements 
in neurotechnology will challenge our notions of disability, ability, and enhancement, 
thus necessitating that Congress reassess the legislative definition of disability. 59  
Contemporary disability theory focuses on how society creates disability.60  Accordingly, 
the ADA must be amended yet again to address the “increasingly broad spectrum of 
ability that will accompany humanity through the twenty-first century.”61 
NEURO INFORMATION NONDISCRIMINATION ACT (NINA) 
In addition to the ADA, which protects individuals from discrimination after a 
condition manifests in the individual, some scholars propose NINA to address concerns 
arising from stigma and discrimination surrounding information gleaned from the human 
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brain before it manifests into a condition. NINA, based largely on the concept of the 
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (“GINA”), will address the potential of 
neuroscience-based discrimination in employment and insurance.62  As a federally-funded 
research program, the BRAIN initiative will likely follow the same path at the Human 
Genome Project.  Just as the Ethical, Legal and Social Implications (“ELSI”) Research 
Program in the Human Genome Project identified ethical considerations surrounding 
stigma and discrimination due to genetic information that gave rise to GINA, ethical 
research by the Bioethics Commission surrounding the Brain Initiative will likely give 
rise to similar concerns about stigma and discrimination surrounding neurological 
information to provide a foundation for NINA.  
GINA was signed into law in May 2008.63  GINA protects job applicants and 
employees from discrimination based on their genetic information.64  The law prohibits 
employers from requesting, requiring, or purchasing genetic information with respect to 
an employee, including personal genetic tests and the genetic tests of family members.65 
GINA prohibits employers from taking adverse employment action against an individual 
based on this genetic information. 66   Adverse employment action includes firing, 
demoting, or failing to promote a qualified person.  GINA also prohibits employers from 
harassing an employee because of his or her genetic information.67  Harassment includes 
making derogatory remarks about an applicant or employee’s genetic information, or that 
of an employee’s relative, to the extent that it is so severe or pervasive that it creates a 
hostile or offensive work environment.68  GINA is intended to protect individuals during 
the time-span between the time an individual’s genetic information reveals the 
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probability of a condition and the time the condition manifests in that individual, when 
the ADA would protect the individual against discrimination.  
GINA is not without flaws.  Some critics argue that the legislation is impractical 
because there exists no efficient, affordable way to separate genetic information from 
non-genetic information in health records.  Mark Rothstein of the Hastings Center warns 
against genetic exceptionalism and instead encourages broad policy reform on all medical 
information, rather than genetic-specific legislation.69  Legislative distinctions between 
genetic information and traditional health information may reinforce the stigma of 
genetic disorders by treating them differently from non-genetic conditions, thereby 
worsening the conditions that the law seeks to remedy.70  While many would argue that it 
is still better to enact a genetic-specific law than nothing at all, critics warns that 
“enacting feel-good legislation with little substantive protection may mislead the 
public.”71  These critiques would likely be similar if NINA were to be passed by 
Congress.  Accordingly, it is important to anticipate potential social consequences of 
neuro-specific legislation.  
NINA, if passed by Congress, would prohibit employers from requesting, 
acquiring, or disclosing the neurological information of their employees.72  It would also 
prohibit employers from discriminating on the basis of neurological information, which 
would not be protected by the ADA until this information becomes expressed in the 
individual in a manner that gives rise to disability. 73   Most importantly, NINA, 
championing individuals’ right to be free from coercive pressure, would prevent 
employers from compelling applicants or employees to engage in neuroenhancement and 
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prohibit discrimination on the basis of the use or nonuse of neuroenhancement 
measures.74 
For example, if some commercial airline pilots choose to engage in 
neuroenhancement and subsequently score better on a performance-based test than those 
who chose not to enhance, NINA may limit employment decisions based on the results in 
order to preserve freedom of choice.75  While there should not be blanket restrictions on 
performance-based testing, factors such as the degree of enhancement and the intent of 
the employer in administering such a test should be taken into consideration.76 
Regardless of whether a separate piece of legislation like NINA is passed or the 
protections are incorporated into pre-existing nondiscrimination laws, neurological 
information discrimination is likely to be a burgeoning field of human rights law in the 
coming years.  It is necessary to take a proactive approach.  The government must take 
action to keep pace with neuroscience developments before individuals are harmed from 
inadequate legal protections.77  Such legislation should be passed before products enter 
the market to ensure that scientific progress does not beat congressional action to the 
finish line due to its lengthy and bureaucratic nature. 78   While bioethics-focused 
government action has been largely reactionary, society “can't afford to take one step 
forward in science but two steps back in civil rights.”79 
Conclusion 
 
The disruptive power of technology raises ethical questions in every field, but none 
more complex than neurotechnology.  As neuroscientific developments continue to 
advance at an exceptional rate, the risks and benefits of such technologies must be 
assessed through ethical principles and frameworks, like those provided by the Bioethics 
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Commission, to anticipate and mitigate potential concerns.   
More importantly, it is critical to take a proactive approach and allow our ethical 
inquiries to guide law and policy, rather than sitting upon our ethical analyses.  In a field 
as complex a neurotechnology, it is vital to anticipate ethical considerations early in the 
development process and mitigate potential pitfalls and gaps in current legislation as a 
result of developments in neurotechnology to ensure that the law keeps pace with the 
scientific process.    	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